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RECENT DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS
Disclosure
Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics provides inter alia:
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting
interests, except by express consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts. Within the meaning of this canon,
a lawyer represents conflicting interests
when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty
to contend for that which duty to another'
requires him to oppose.1
This statement, unqualified by any other
part of the Canon, reasonably implies that
with full disclosure and consent an at-
torney may represent any and all conflicting
interests. However, the legal profession in
interpreting Canon 6 has placed various
limitations on the applicability of the con-
sent exception. It is evident, therefore, that
Canon 6 does not clearly reflect the actual
ethical standard which is presently applied
to conflicting interests.
In the recent case of Jedwabny v. Phila-
delphia Transportation Co.2 the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania refused to apply the
consent exception. In a suit for personal in-
juries and property damage arising out of
an automobile-street car collision brought
by the car owner-driver and two passen-
gers, the defendant-transportation company
joined the plaintiff-owner as an additional
defendant. The attorney retained by co-
plaintiffs also acted as attorney for defen-
dant-owner. Joint verdicts were rendered
in favor of plaintiff-passengers against the
co-defendants and the plaintiff-owner's suit
was dismissed. The trial judge, on his own
1 Canon 6, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION.
2 390 Pa. 231, 135 A.2d 252 (1957) cert. denied,
355 U.S. 966 (1958).
motion, then ordered a new trial because of
the conflict of interests since it was not de-
termined that a full disclosure had been
made to all parties. The Supreme Court,
without considering the question of full
disclosure, affirmed, holding that because of
the existing conflict of interest the attorney
could not represent both the co-plaintiffs
and defendant-owner.3
The invocation of limitations on the con-
sent exception is usually based on the broad*
grounds of public policy. It has often been
declared that an attorney may not act on
both sides of a litigation: 4 for example,
because of the possibility of collusion, an
attorney may not represent both the hus-
band and wife in a divorce action.; The
consent exception is also rejected where the
3 The Court quoted the pertinent part of Canon
6 and subsequently stated: "The foregoing canon
applies to cases where the circumstances are such
that possibly conflicting interests may permissibly
be represented by the same attorney. But, mani-
festly, there are instances where the conflicts of
interest are so critically adverse as not to admit
of one attorney's representing both sides. Such is
the situation which this record presents." Jed-
wabny v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 390 Pa. 231,
135 A.2d 252, 254 (1957). This statement by the
Court clearly refers to the consent exception of
Canon 6 since the Court applied the remainder of
the quoted Canon in determining the case.
4 Bose v. Wehrli, 186 Misc. 325, 60 N.Y.S.2d 213
(Sup. Ct. 1945). See also American Box & Drum
Co. v. Harron, 44 Cal. App. 2d 370, 112 P.2d 332
(1941) where the court implied the same rule.
The court wrote: "In the absence of litigation,
existing or contemplated, an attorney is not pre-
cluded from representing adverse parties provid-
ing his employment is within the knowledge and
with the consent of each and he deals fairly with
both." Id. at 334.
5 Todd v. Rhodes, 108 Kan. 64, 193 Pac. 894
(1920) (dictum). See also DRINKER, LEGAL ETH-
ics 128 (1953).
conflict is antagonistic 6 or the attorney's
position is such that if he acts beneficially
towards one party, that act tends to the
detriment of the other.7 This was clearly
exemplified in the case of Gillette v. New-
house Realty Co.s wherein the court stated,
The rule that an attorney may not by his
contract of employment place himself in a
position where his own interests or the inter-
ests of another, whom he represents, con-
flict with the interests of his client ...is
designed ...to preclude the honest prac-
titioner from putting himself in a position
where he may be required to choose be-
tween conflicting duties or between his own
interests and those of his client .... 9
The consent exception is sometimes in-
applicable because of the status of the in-
dividual rather than the peculiarity of the
situation. A public officer can not repre-
sent conflicting interests since a public in-
terest is involved and the public can not
consent. 10 The Committee on Professional
Ethics and Grievances of the American Bar
Association has stated that ". . . it is the
duty of an attorney in public employ to be
and remain above all suspicion, even at
personal financial sacrifice."'" It has also
been held that in the case of a minor the
consent exception is ineffectual since the
minor is incapable of giving consent.' 2
6 See, e.g., Field v. Moore, 189 App. Div. 709,
713, 178 N.Y. Supp. 842, 846 (1st Dep't 1919)
(dictum).
7 See, e.g., Matter of Sielcken, 162 Misc. 54, 66,
293 N.Y. Supp. 721, 734 (Surr. Ct. 1937) (dic-
tum).
8 75 Utah 13, 282 Pac. 776 (1929).
9 Id. at 779.
10 See, e.g., Opinions 16 and 34, OPINIONS OF THE
A.B.A. COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND
GRIEVANCES 89, 119 (1957); DRINKER, LEGAL
ETHICS 120 (1953).
11 Opinion 77, OPINIONS OF THE A.B.A. COMMIT-
TEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES
183 (1957).
12 In re Pfiffner's Guardianship, 194 S.W.2d 233
(Mo. 1946).
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The Chicago Bar Association, in view
of these various limitations, has amended
its Canon 6 and eliminated the consent ex-
ception.' 3 However, the elimination of the
consent exception raises the inference that
under the amended Canon an attorney may
never represent conflicting interests. Thus,
since it is generally'held and has been
clearly stated that "it is not always im-
proper or unlawful for an attorney at law
to represent conflicting interests,' 1 4 the Chi-
cago Bar Association has taken an extreme
position. It has removed one undesirable
aspect of the Canon but created another,
and the amended Canon continues to in-
accurately reflect the law. Apparently the
Chicago Bar Association view has been
rejected by the American Bar Association
since the Committee on Professional Ethics
and Grievances has on several occasions
refused to recommend the deletion of the
consent exception from Canon 6.15
In the ordinary case, objective moral
values will provide a standard against
which to gauge the legal ethics of particu-
lar activity. However, Jedwabny illustrates
an exception - an isolated area in which
objective moral norms do not furnish a
ready criterion. In such instances, the wis-
dom and experience of the legal profession
furnish precautionary rules to preclude
13 See DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 120 (1953).
14 Eisemann v. Hazard, 218 N.Y. 155, 159, 112
N.E. 722, 723 (1916). See also DRINKER, Op. Cit.
supra note 13. There is dictum in a New York
case which states that an attorney may properly
represent several partners in the formation, con-
duct and dissolution of a partnership, or a widow
in her dual capacity of executrix and beneficiary,
or a creditor of ail estate in his capacity as admin-
istrator. Matter of Sielcken, 162 Misc. 54, 66, 293
N.Y. Supp. 721, 735 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
15 Decision 296, OPINIONS OF THE A.B.A. COM-
MITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GaIEV-
ANCES 643 (1957).
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attorneys, whose moral conduct is beyond
reproach, from nevertheless finding them-
selves in difficult and anomalous situations
The object of the Canons of Professional
Ethics is to establish a more definite state-
ment of the accepted rules of professional
conduct, easily accessible and in simple
form.1 6 The Canons thereby serve a two-
fold purpose: first, as a guide to law
students and attorneys, second, as a declara-
tion by the profession to the public of the
ethical standards required of its members.
In both cases it is essential that the Canons
be clear and unequivocal.
It is suggested that Canon 6 be amended
to include the recognized limitations upon
the consent exception. Canon 6 would then
reflect the actual attitude and standard of
the profession and clearly state the accepted
rule of professional conduct concerning
conflicting interests.
The Religious Factor in
Choice of Adoptive Parents
In a recent New York case,' a child born
to appellant, a Catholic, was surrendered
by her to respondents, non-Catholics, who
subsequently obtained an order of adop-
tion. The appellant contested on the two
grounds that the order violated Section 111
of the Domestic Relations Law 2 because
she had legally withdrawn her consent
before the adoption proceeding and that it
violated Section 373 (3) of the Social Wel-
fare Law which states in part that ". . . in
16 See DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 25 (1953).
1 In re Maxwell's Adoption, 4 N.Y.2d 429, 151
N.E.2d 848, 176 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1958). The de-
cision was four to three.
2 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111, which states in
part that consent is required "of the parents or
surviving parent. . . .The consent shall not be
required of a parent who has abandoned the
child .. "
granting orders of adoption .. .the court
shall, when practicable, . . . give custody
...only to . . .persons of the same relig-
ious faith as that of the child." The foster
parents agreed to have the child baptized
in the Catholic faith and educated in
Catholic schools. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the lower court
giving the child to the foster parents. The
Court found that appellant had abandoned
the child, making her consent under Sec-
tion 111 unnecessary. 3 In construing the
language of Section 373(3) the Court held
that it contained no absolute requirement
that the faith of the foster parent be that
of the child.
Adoption was unknown at common law;
it is purely a creature of statute. 4 Today all
of the states have adoption statutes. 5 Of
the considerations in determining the suit-
ability of foster parents, one of the most
important is the matching of the religious
faiths of the foster parents and the child.,
In the United States this element has been
given three different treatments. In some
states it has been considered the decisive
factor, requiring absolute refusal of the
adoption petition where the religious faith
3 See note 2 supra.
4 See Asch, A Critical Appraisal of Adoption in
New York State, 20 BROOKLYN L. REV. 27-28
(1954).
5 See Note, Moppets on the Market: The Problem
of Unregulated Adoptions, 59 YALE L. J. 715
(1950). The first state to have an adoption statute
was Massachusetts in 1851. The last state was
Texas in 1925. New York passed its first statute
concerning adoption in 1873. Id. at 725.
6 Aside from the Catholic viewpoint of this prac-
tice of matching religions, it is considered desir-
able practice by social workers. See Note, Mop-
pets on the Market: The Problem of Unregulated
Adoptions, supra note 5. See generally Leen,
Justice Denied - The Ellis Case, 4 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 83 (Winter 1958).
of the child differs from that of the pros-
pective parents.' More often, however, it
has been treated as one of the many con-
siderations in determining the fitness of the
prospective parents, without being given
conclusive weight.8 However, most states
accord this element no consideration at all.
This is indicated by the lack of religious
protection statutes in those jurisdictions.
It is the settled public policy of the State
of New York to protect the religious faith
of children. This is evidenced by Section 18
of Article 6 of the State Constitution which
7 Decisive treatment:
New York -see N. Y. CONST. art. 6, § 18;
N. Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§113, 117; N. Y. Soc.
WELFARE LAW §§ 373(3), (4); N. Y. C. DoM.
REL. CT. ACT. § 88(3). See also In re Santos,
278 App. Div. 373, 105 N.Y.S. 2d 716 (1st
Dep't 1951); In re Anonymous, 195 Misc. 6,
88 N.Y.S. 2d 829 (Surr. Ct. 1949); In re Korte,
78 Misc. 276, 139 N.Y. Supp. 444 (County Ct.
1912).
Rhode ]sland- R. I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-13
(1956) (If a suitable person of the same faith
is available, then "same faith" adoption is
mandatory).
8 Discretionary treatment:
California - CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE
§§551, 552, 1524 (1956); Colorado-CoLo.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-1-7(e) (1953); Connecti-
cut - CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6867 (1949); Dela-
ware - DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 911 (1953);
Georgia - GA. CODE ANN. § 74-411(6) (Supp.
1955); Iowa-IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.1 (1950);
Louisiana - LA. REV. STAT. tit. 13, § 1581
(1956); Maryland-MD. ANN. CODE art. 16,
§ 67 (Supp. 1957); Massachusetts - MASS.
ANN. LAWS c. 210, § 5B (1957); Michigan -
MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 27.3178(545(e)) (Supp.
1957); New Hampshire-N. H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 461.2 (1957); New Jersey- N. J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:3-23 (1957); Ohio- OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.015(e) (1958); Okla-
homa - OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 824 (Supp.
1958); Pennsylvania - PA. STAT. ANN. tit. I
§ 1(d) (Supp. 1957); Washington - WASH.
REv. CODE §26.32.090 (1957); Wisconsin-
WIS. STAT. § 48.82(3) (1955).
"Those states not listed in notes 7 & 8 supra have
no such statutes.
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provides for the placement of children with
families or institutions of the same religious
persuasion, by the early treatment of the
problem by the courts, 10 and by the enact-
ment of a number of statutes safeguarding
the religion of the child.1"
The instant case poses two important
problems concerning the protection of an
adopted child's religion: first, the effect of
the Catholic mother's misconduct on the
child's right to be brought up in that re-
ligion, and second, whether the mandate of
Section 373(3) of the Social Welfare
Law12 is obeyed when a Catholic child is
placed in a home wherein another religion
is practiced, even though there is a promise
to baptize the child in the Catholic faith and
to send him to Catholic primary and second-
ary schools.
According to Catholic philosophy and
theology we have a duty to worship God.13
As a corollary, one has the moral right to
fulfill that duty. A Catholic fulfills this duty
through the practice of his religion. There-
fore he has a right to practice his religion,
which cannot be affected by the misconduct
10 See In re Miller, 179 N.Y. Supp. 181 (County
Ct. 1919); In re Korte, 78 Misc. 276, 139 N.Y.
Supp. 444 (County Ct. 1912).
"N. Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 113, 117; N. Y. Soc.
WELFARE LAW §§ 373(3), (4).
1 2 Section 373(4) requires that it be "... inter-
preted as to assure that in the care, protection,
adoption, guardianship, discipline and control of
any child, its religious faith shall be preserved and
protected." (Emphasis added.)
13- AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-Il, q. 94, art.
3, which says in part that "all acts of virtue are
prescribed by natural law"; id., I1-11, q. 81, art. 2:
"... [R]eligion is a virtue .. " Therefore it is
safe to say that acts of religion are prescribed by
natural law. Also, in. id., II-1I, q. 81, art. 7, it is
said that while the external act of divine worship
is secondary to internal acts of religion, it.is nec-
essary to the virtue of religion. See also Cox,
LIBERTY, ITS USE AND ABUSE, 121-27, 157-68
(1946).
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of any party, even that of his natural
mother.
The compliance of the majority of the
Court of Appeals with the mandate of the
statute is but a token: it is not sufficient,
for it does not adequately preserve and
protect the religious faith of the child. The
potentially dangerous effects of the home
atmosphere in this case are apparent. It is,
at best, indifferent and, at worst, hostile.
Full compliance with the spirit of the stat-
ute requires a home in which the child is
given opportunity for the full practice of
his religion, one in which there is neither
hostility nor inconsistent influence. Such
considerations are especially important in
this case, where the faith to be protected
is that of a young child. It follows that full
compliance would be achieved only by
placement in a home where the Catholic
religion is faithfully practiced, one which
can adequately preserve and protect this
young faith.
In its opinion, the Court declares that
by any other holding ". . . the foster parents
would ever run the risk of not being able
to adopt the child, and the child ever sub-
jected to the danger of having attachments
formed painfully severed .... ,,4 This state-
ment indicates that the Court was swayed
by considerations such as the length of time
the child had been with the petitioners and
the finding of the lower court that the
natural mother had deliberately abandoned
the child at birth. It is hoped that in future
cases the authority of the instant case will
be restricted to its facts, and that the Court
will comply with the mandate of Section
373.
14 In Re Maxwell's Adoption, 4 N.Y.2d 429, 434,
151 N.E.2d 848, 850, 176 N.Y.S.2d 281, 284
(1958).
Right to Travel
In Kent v. Dulles1 petitioner's applica-
tion for a passport was denied by the State
Department on the grounds of his pro-
communist activities and his refusal to sign
an affidavit concerning his past and pres-
ent membership in the Communist Party.
The district court's dismissal of peti-
tioner's application for declaratory relief
was affirmed by the court of appeals. 2 The
United States Supreme Court reversed,
holding that when Congress authorized the
regulation of passports by the Secretary of
State, it did not grant him unbridled dis-
cretion. The Court stated that the right to
travel is a "liberty" protected by the Fifth
Amendment from abridgement without due
process of law. Congressional delegation
of the power to regulate the exercise of that
liberty must be narrowly construed.
International travel is a natural right
protected by the Constitution.4 It is also a
natural right within the Natural Law which
". .. does indeed imply the existence of
some human rights which are absolute and
inalienable, such as . . .locomotion. ... _
It is of course limited or subject to restric-
tion by considerations of the common good
and the exercise by others of their legiti-
mate rights. It is not, however, morally
restrictable by arbitrary or capricious dic-
tates of a state. 6 Travel was early recog-
nized by the courts as one of those "liber-
1357 U.S. 116 (1958) (5-4 decision).
2 Kent v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
3 See Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938, 941
(D.C. Cir. 1955); see generally 3 CATHOLIC LAW-
YER 85 (Jan. 1957).
4 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958).
5 Kenealy, Whose Natural Law?, 1 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 259, 263 (Oct. 1955).
6 3 CATHOLIC LAWYER 85, 87 (Jan. 1957).
ties" protected by the Constitution.' Since
the passport is presently a requisite for
travel abroad, s the regulations for its issu-
ance are now, in effect, the regulations for
the exercise of that liberty.
The evolution of the passport can be
traced from a mere certificate of attestation
of United States citizenship 9 to its present
importance as a necessity for exit' ° that
can be issued only by the State Depart-
ment.1 1 The Secretary's power to grant
or deny passport applications is of a dis-
cretionary nature. 12 It is the Secretary's
exercise of this discretion that has been
questioned in many of the recent cases. 18
State Department practice has been held
inadequate both procedurally 14 and sub-
7 See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35
(1867). This case is distinguishable from the
instant case in that interstate rather than inter-
national travel was involved; nevertheless in Cran-
dall the Court recognized the right of travel as
coming within the purview of the Fifth Amend-
ment.
8 Pres. Proc. No. 2523, 6 Fed. Reg. 5821 (1941).
9 See Urtetiqui v. D'Arcy, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692,
699 (1835).
10 See note 8 supra.
1144 STAT. 657 (1926), 22 U.S.C. § 211(a)
(1952).
12 22 C.F.R. § 51.75 (1958).
13 See, e.g., Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938
(D.C. Cir. 1955); Nathan v. Dulles, 129 F. Supp.
951 (D.D.C. 1955).
14 See, e.g., Nathan v. Dulles, supra note 13 in
which the court held that the plaintiff was entitled
to a hearing. The procedure to be used in the
presence of State Department deficiencies in this
area was indicated in subsequent hearings. See
Dulles v. Nathan, 225 F.2d 29, 30 (D.C. Cir.
.1955). See generally Boudin, The Constitutional
Right to Travel, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 47, 68 n. 127
(1956), which describes the Passport Office pro-
cedure in Kamen v. Dulles, Civil No. 5799-53,
D.D.C., July 8, 1955. "Dr. Kamen's passport was
revoked in 1947 without notice or hearing. Nu-
merous efforts between 1947 and 1953 to secure
a passport met with a 'best interests' answer. His
application of September, 1952 was not acted
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stantively 15 in satisfying due process.
In the instant case the Court, by nar-
rowly construing congressional delegation
of regulatory power, apparently restricts
permissible grounds for denial of a passport
by the Department to questions of citizen-
ship and allegiance, and participation in
illegal conduct. It bases these limitations
upon prior administrative practice. 16
The case, in effect, terminates the effort
of the State Department to deny passports
to individuals of questionable loyalty. 17
In its opinion the Court does not specify
the constitutionally permissible limitations
upon the right to travel.' 8 It does, however,
treat the right as so basic that, even in the
face of the present threat to national secur-
upon until his mandamus suit in December 1953
resulted in the formation of the board [the there-
tofore nonexistent Board of Passport Appeals], a
hearing before it, and an adverse decision of the
Secretary of State in April, 1954. His petition for
rehearing in June, 1954 was not acted upon until
March, 1955 and then adversely. He instituted
another suit on March 14, 1955, D.C. Civil No.
1121-55, D.D.C., and received his passport four
months later."
15 See, e.g., Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938
(D.C. Cir. 1955), where the court held that mem-
bership in an organization on the Attorney Gen-
eral's list was not of itself sufficient grounds on
which to base a refusal to issue a passport.
16 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 128 (1958).
17 See Communist Use and Abuse of Passports,
Hearing Before the Subcommittee To Investigate
the Administration of the Internal Security Act
and Other Internal Security Laws of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary United States Senate, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), in which Robert D. John-
son, the Chief of the Legal Division of the State
Department Passport Office testified as to the
effects of the Kent case on pending passport appli-
cations. He stated that with the exception of one
individual (who was awaiting trial in a contempt
proceeding), passports were immediately issued
to all applicants, approximately seventy in num-
ber, eleven of which were in litigation under the
regulations. id. at 4.
18 Kent v. Dulles, supra note 16, at 129. "Thus we
do not reach the question of Constitutionality .. "
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ity, extension beyond existing limitations
will be scrutinized to determine whether it
amounts to deprivation of liberty without
due process.
Thus, the Kent case poses many prob-
lems in this area of passport regulation
which, consequently, involve the right to
travel. As Jaffee declares, ". . . the consti-
tutional approach begs the paramount issue
... not how far we can go... but precisely
what our policy should be." 19 The group
we intend to prevent from traveling, and
the standard of adjudging a particular indi-
Vidual as fitting within this group are nec-
essary determinations. 20 Complicating the
19 Jaffee, The Right to Travel: The Passport Prob-
lem, 35 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 17, 22 (Oct. 1956).
20 See Jaffee, supra note 19, who states that
"nearly every passport denial has been a decision
to keep the citizen here within the high walled
fortress where he can be isolated, neutralized,
kept, let us say, to his accustomed and observable
rules of malefaction. It has simply one facet of
our tactic of domestic security .. " Id. at 18.
He continues, ". . . despite the heavy risks of mal-
administration, the United States is, in my opin-
ion, justified in denying passports to persons
whose journey abroad is presumptively in further-
ance of the Communist 'conspiracy'." Id. at 27
(emphasis added). Although unfavorably dis-
posed towards the use of secret evidence urged
by the government as necessary to avoid disclo-
sure of secret materials, he "does not . . . urge
upon the reader the absolute rejection of the
secret dossier." Id. at 28. In conclusion, he draws
the line for passport denial at "demonstrable
matter is the problem of safeguarding the
sources of information used by those inves-
tigating passport applications, disclosure of
which would in some cases be inimical to
the security of the nation.
In order to remedy this situation, the
House of Representatives has recently
passed legislation 21 similar to those regu-
lations of the State Department 22 which
were the basis for the original denial of the
passport to the petitioner in the instant
case. If passed, the bill will expressly dele-
gate to the Secretary the regulatory power
which the Court in the Kent case held he
lacked. The Court expressly reserved deci-
sion on the question of constitutionality. 23
Its stressing of the right to travel as such a
basic right, indicates that any curtailment,
even by Congress, will be carefully consid-
ered in its relation to due process require-
ments.
24
Communist involvement" or "other cases of simi-
lar danger" but finds "intolerable" basing denial
on a bureau determination that granting a pass-
port would be contrary to "the interests of the
United States." Ibid.
21 H.R. 13760, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
22 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.101-.170 (1958).
2 3 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958).
24 Id. at 130: "To repeat, we deal here with a con-
stitutional right of the citizen, a right which we
must assume Congress will be faithful to respect."
